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INTRODUCTION
The requirement that applicants to the bar possess "good
moral character," although well-established ... today, appears
to be a relatively recent arrival to Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
For much of American history attorneys distinguished
themselves, not by good works and saintly disposition, but by
acts of violence that would confine them to imprisonment if
committed in modern America....
... By the 1920s, states began to create "moral fitness
committees," inevitably composed of persons with spotless
backgrounds. By the middle of the twentieth century, moral
character investigations grew to encompass such matters as
divorce, cohabitation, and even violation of fishing license
statutes. While empirical research establishes no correlation
between "problem" applications and later disciplinary
proceedings, the modern character and fitness process is viewed
as an important component in the maintenance of the legal
profession's public standing.1
Under a reasonable working assumption, I had expected to
show that the profession's "good moral character" requirement
for admission had returned to an all-time low.2 That is, the
following study of the published decisions and scholarly research
should have proven that bar associations and state supreme
courts had loosened significantly their views of disqualifying
moral character. That conclusion would not have been the bad
thing that one might assume. 3
I was wrong. What the research instead shows is that strict
moral character screening not only continues to thrive, but it has
reached an all-time high. To be sure, character screeners have
I Roger Roots, When Lawyers Were Serial Killers: Nineteenth Century Visions of
Good Moral Character, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 19, 19, 34-35 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
2 Several commentators corroborated my initial assumption. See, e.g., Maureen
M. Carr, The Effect of Prior Criminal Conduct on the Admission to Practice Law: The
Move to More Flexible Standards, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 367, 368 (1995) ("In
recent years, cases and changing rules have highlighted the fact that bar admission
committees and courts have become somewhat more forgiving in their acceptance of
[applicants with criminal records] into the legal profession. This position represents
a change from earlier, stricter stances." (emphasis added)).
3 Public safety rhetoric notwithstanding, most of the moral character barrier is
merely a means of protecting the profession's public image. That weak and self-
protective justification should be abandoned or at least narrowly circumscribed. See
infra Parts IV-V.
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limited their use of truly irrelevant (and probably
unconstitutional) inquiries, such as cohabitation and
communism. With respect to this Article's primary concern,
character screening in response to applicants' criminal records,
however, the reported cases-and reported denials of
admission-have never been higher. That is to say, the number
of these cases has never been higher-not even close-in this
country's entire history. Thus, what I had assumed was a dying
vestige of an unreasonably unforgiving age is actually a fixed and
growing epidemic in which the bar continues to exclude
applicants who could do the work ethically, but who allegedly
would tarnish the bar's public standing.
This Article ultimately demonstrates that the bar's "moral
judges" have developed an unintelligible crucible through which
to run problem applicants. Part I lists the surprisingly sinister
history of moral character review. Part II provides an overview
of its current application. Part III, through compiling and coding
the published opinions over the last quarter century, documents
the marked rise in character screening of applicants with
criminal records. Part IV illustrates that character screening, as
applied, is both perverse and unrealistic. Part V weighs the
arguments for character review and determines that they are
overwhelmingly baseless.4 Part VI concludes by offering some
parting advice to the participants in the character review
process.
I. THE CROOKED HISTORY OF AMERICAN CHARACTER REVIEW
While some have attempted to legitimize the "good moral
character ' 5 requirement by alluding to its long-standing roots,
4 After apparently cursory reviews of publicly available drafts of this Article,
some commentators have denounced (inaccurate summaries of) my views as radical.
Because of these misconceptions, I deny explicitly what was already implicit in the
Article: I am not in favor of crime or immoral (or even amoral) character. Indeed, one
of my "ground projects" is to infuse ethics into the practice of law. See, e.g., Keith
Swisher, The Moral Judge, 56 DRAKE L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (articulating
adjudicatory justice and anticipating the moral adjudicator). Unfortunately, as
described in detail in this Article, the past and present "good moral character"
requirement does not assist legal practice in this, or virtually any other, laudable
goal. Nevertheless, the limited merit of character screening is acknowledged and
addressed in Part V below and its limited future utility is discussed in the
Conclusion.
5 The most frequently quoted definition of "good moral character" is Justice
Frankfurter's:
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the real story hardly reveals a time-honored tradition.6 Indeed,
as we will see, the bar did not begin officially enforcing "good
moral character" until well into the twentieth century.7
Furthermore, when enforcement finally occurred, both its
motivations and outcomes were extremely problematic.
American character screening "in form"-but not in
practice-began appearing in the mid-seventeenth century in
response to "animus against lawyers' 'blood-suck [ing]' practices."8
State legislatures, therefore, "sought to impose character
requirements for admission to the bar."9 The resulting statutes,
One does not have to inhale the self-adulatory bombast of after-dinner
speeches to affirm that all the interests of man that are comprised under
the constitutional guarantees given to "life, liberty and property" are in the
professional keeping of lawyers.... From a profession charged with such
responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of
a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been
compendiously described as "moral character."
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 2 cmt. d (2000)
(alluding to the fact that "as far back as the first bars in medieval England efforts
have been made to screen candidates for the bar with respect to their character").
The Restatement does note, however, the inquiry's long-standing problems
occasioned by
the difficulty of defining the standards of character thought to be minimal,
the difficulty of ensuring fair application of. . . standards under the claim
of rigorous examination, and the overriding difficulty of predicting future
professional conduct from a necessarily abbreviated personal history and
the committee's access to such past activities as are sufficiently public to be
checked.
Id.
7 There was, however, "one major exception to open membership"-women:
United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field (a man who was
arrested and disbarred more than once during his own career) was willing
to allow a lynch mob killer to practice law but concluded that women
should be barred from the practice because the "natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life."
Roots, supra note 1, at 22 (quoting Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141
(1873) (Bradley, J., concurring)) (footnotes omitted).
8 Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J.
491, 496 (1985). Professor Rhode's exhaustive article remains the preeminent work
on the subject of moral character screening. This Article in part updates and
expands some of her relevant conclusions using court decisions, scholarly studies,
and commentary from the twenty-plus years since she published her article.
9 Id. at 496-97 (noting requirements such as references from ministers and
court examination).
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however, appeared to be ineffectual or unused.10 Indeed, in the
entire nineteenth century, there were virtually no reported
instances in which applicants were banned for their character. 1
Character screening effectively arrived in the early
twentieth century. By 1927, a supermajority of the states had
"strengthen[ed] character inquiries through mandatory
interviews, character questionnaires, committee oversight, or
related measures."'1 2  For the legal profession, the rise in
character screening seems to have arisen from several
problematic concerns: "Much of the initial impetus for more
stringent character scrutiny arose in response to an influx of
Eastern European immigrants, which threatened the profession's
public standing. Nativist and ethnic prejudices during the 1920s,
coupled with economic pressures during the Depression, fueled a
renewed drive for entry barriers.' 13
The operation proved successful; it dropped the admitted
number of persons from "unworthy" groups. 14 The strict scrutiny
did not end with ethnicity or gender. Instead, using the
10 Id.
11 See id. at 497; Roots, supra note 1, at 21-22. Indeed, American attorneys and
judges had a notable history of violence, for which they suffered no denials of
admission or professional discipline. See Roots, supra note 1, at 22-34 (documenting
numerous instances of undisciplined violence by famous and not-so-famous
attorneys, judges, and two former Presidents).
12 Rhode, supra note 8, at 499; see also ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 94-95 (1983) (discussing the
rise of bar examiner committees in the states). The rise in character requirements
paralleled that of other "professions" during the period, including "barbers,
beauticians, embalmers, engineers, veterinarians, optometrists, geologists,
shorthand reporters, commercial photographers, boxers, piano tuners, trainers of
guide dogs for the blind, and-ironically enough-vendors of erotica." Rhode, supra
note 8, at 499.
13 Rhode, supra note 8, at 499-500; see also id. at 500-01 (recounting an
instance "[a]t the first National Bar Examiners Conference in 1933, [in which] the
former Chairman of the ABA's section on Legal Education and Admission
acknowledged that 'sometimes you have wonderful character evidence displayed
even though the applicant is not well educated or his parents were born in Russia'"
(quoting Character Examination of Candidates, 1 B. EXAMINER 63, 72 (1932))).
14 See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 127 (1976); Rhode, supra note 8,
at 501 (citing percentages); see also STEVENS, supra note 12, at 92-103 (discussing
the ABA's efforts to establish market controls in the early twentieth century, which
included "ethnic" controls); Patrick L. Baude, An Essay on the Regulation of the
Legal Profession and the Future of Lawyers' Characters, 68 IND. L.J. 647, 648 (1993)
("Powerful historic accounts have argued that the reforms earlier in the century
were more effective at elevating the income and status of the profession than at
protecting the public.").
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justification that "'with an overcrowded bar and an abundance of
candidates who have unquestioned character,'" the bar excluded
all perceived "problem" applicants, such as "radicals, religious
fanatics, divorcees, fornicators, and any individual who
challenged the profession's anticompetitive ethical canons."15
The bar then went after communists, and although it achieved
modest initial success in barring them, its ultimate defeat was
memorialized in two famous Supreme Court opinions.
The Constitution finally caught up to arbitrary character
review: Screening requirements henceforth had to have a
rational connection to fitness to practice law. 16 At that point, in
the late 1950s, one reasonably could have assumed-indeed, one
reasonably could have demanded-that the bar would dismantle
character review. 17 As we will see, however, such a reasonable
assumption somehow never materialized.18
"Despite relatively powerful rhetoric and argument against
such inquiries,... ex ante inquiries into character and
fitness... remain a major feature of admission to the legal
profession."1 9  Although the reported data generally do not
suggest that large numbers are excluded through modern
15 Rhode, supra note 8, at 502 (quoting An Answer to the Problem of the
Bootlegger's Son, 1 B. EXAMINER 109, 110 (1932)).
16 See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 263-64 (1957); Schware v.
Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (holding that due process and equal
protection require a rational connection between character screening and fitness to
practice law). In Konigsberg, the Court stated that the bar's moral character
requirement was "a vague qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal views
and predilections, [and] can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and
discriminatory denial of the right to practice law." 353 U.S. at 263.
17 See Baude, supra note 14, at 649. Patrick Baude has noted the troubling
history of character review and the even more troubling persistence of it:
Among sociologists and historians of the legal profession, it is a common
belief that these character and fitness restrictions were aimed at keeping
the American bar as Anglo-Saxon as possible .... It seems clear that the
requirements no longer serve their original purpose. Even more striking, it
seems hard to see that the requirements serve any straightforward
purpose.
Id. (footnote omitted).
18 In fact, in the early 1970s, the bar even achieved a roundabout victory on the
communism issue. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond,
401 U.S. 154, 165-66 (1971) (allowing committees to ask questions designed to
discover communism and ultimately permitting committees to deny admission to
applicants who refuse to answer their questions).
19 John S. Dzienkowski, Character and Fitness Inquiries in Law School
Admissions, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 921, 922-23 (2004) (footnote omitted).
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character review, "the system's greatest significance may lie in
its deterrent and legitimating dimensions."20
II. THE MECHANICS OF MODERN CHARACTER REVIEW
Every state requires applicants to prove good moral
character before admission to the bar.21  Bar committees
ordinarily screen applicants for the requisite good moral
character. 22  In practice, "good" moral character means the
absence of proven "misconduct."23  Thus, according to the bar,
"relevant conduct" in this inquiry is all of the following:
[U]nlawful conduct; academic misconduct; making of false
statements, including omissions; [24 misconduct in employment;
acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
abuse of legal process; neglect of financial responsibilities;
neglect of professional obligations; violation of an order of a
court; evidence of mental or emotional instability; evidence of
drug or alcohol dependency; denial of admission to the bar in
another jurisdiction on character and fitness grounds;
20 Rhode, supra note 8, at 502.
21 See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM'RS & AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION
REQUIREMENTS 6-7 chart 11 (2007) [hereinafter NCBE GUIDE]; see also id. at vii ("A
bar examiner should exhibit courage, judgment and moral stamina in refusing to
recommend applicants... who lack moral character and fitness.").
22 Applicants bear the burden of showing good moral character, and they can be
denied admission for failing to provide relevant (and even irrelevant) information to
the committees. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1(b) (2003)
(requiring applicants to answer committee questions).
23 Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A
Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV.
187, 199 (1995) ("An Alabama court circularly defined 'good moral character' to
practice law 'as an absence of proven conduct or acts which have been historically
considered manifestations of moral turpitude.'" (quoting Reese v. Bd. of Comm'rs,
379 So. 2d 564, 569 (Ala. 1980))); see, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S.
252, 263 (1957) (noting that moral character is the "absence of proven conduct or
acts which have been historically considered as manifestations of 'moral
turpitude' ").
24 In order to "maintaino the integrity of the profession," the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct echo this duty:
An applicant for admission to the bar.., shall not: (a) knowingly make a
false statement of material fact; or (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to
correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the
matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information
from an admissions or disciplinary authority ....
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (2002).
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disciplinary action by a lawyer disciplinary agency or other
professional disciplinary agency of any jurisdiction. 25
The ultimate question is "whether the present character and
fitness of an applicant qualifies the applicant for admission,"
even though the inquiry almost exclusively looks at past acts.26
Every state bar application thus asks questions designed
(sometimes crudely) to elicit this wealth of past "relevant
conduct."
To elicit past criminal records, in particular, both bar and
law school applications make broad inquiries into applicants'
past criminal conduct. A typical question asks, "Have you ever
been arrested, cited for, or charged with a crime or a delinquent
act?"27 Law school applications ask similar questions. One law
professor has suggested that the use and breadth of schools'
questions have increased within the last decade or two. 28 In a
2003 survey, all of the top twenty law schools "ask[ed] [for]
information about an applicant's conduct relating to the criminal
laws."29  Fifteen of these schools, however, asked only about
convictions, not arrests or charges. 30 Almost all of the Texas
schools, in comparison, asked about arrests. 31
In theory, however, applicants' criminal records-including
felony convictions-do not preclude bar admission in nearly all of
the states.3 2 Only three states-Indiana, Missouri, and perhaps
25 NCBE GUIDE, supra note 21, 13, at viii; see, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 36(b)(3).
26 NCBE GUIDE, supra note 21, 15, at viii (emphasis added).
27 DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, REAL ETHICS FOR REAL LAWYERS 647 (2005)
(excerpt from an Iowa bar application); see also id. at 654 ("Have you ever been
charged with or been the subject of any investigation for a felony or misdemeanor
other than a minor traffic charge?" (excerpt from a Massachusetts bar application)).
28 Dzienkowski, supra note 19, at 923-24 (noting that the University of Texas
added a criminal record question after 1988, and "suspect[ing] that during the last
fifteen years, educational institutions have added questions to their applications
with an idea to warn students about the bar process and to exclude applicants with
serious character issues").
29 Id. at 927.
30 Id.
31 Id. The disparity could be explained partially by the subtle insecurity complex
that many of the lower-ranked schools seem to exhibit. Given this (unproven)
preoccupation with professional reputation and standing, then, they may be more
likely to screen applicants who might bring negative publicity to their institution.
See infra Parts V.A.1, V.A.4.
32 See Carr, supra note 2, at 368-69 (citing NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM'RS
& AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS (1994)). Some states
have "five-year" rules-meaning that bar applicants cannot be admitted for a set
1044 [Vol. 82:1037
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Oregon-apparently do not permit certain convicted felons to
practice law, ever.33 The rest of the states use a presumptive
disqualification approach. 34 This approach requires that problem
applicants prove that they are fully rehabilitated and possess
present good moral character.3 5  "For bar fitness purposes,
rehabilitation is the reestablishment of the reputation of a person
by his or her restoration to a useful and constructive place in
society."36  In making these determinations, committees
ostensibly balance all of the following factors:
[T]he applicant's age at the time of the conduct; the recency of
the conduct; the reliability of the information concerning the
conduct; the seriousness of the conduct; the cumulative effect of
conduct or information; the evidence of rehabilitation; the
applicant's positive social contributions since the conduct; the
applicant's candor in the admissions process; [and] the
materiality of any omissions or misrepresentations. 37
number of years, usually five, following a felony conviction. See infra Conclusion.
33 See NCBE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 6-7 chart II. Oregon apparently uses a
problematically selective bar to felons. See generally In re Beers, 118 P.3d 784 (Or.
2005) (per curiam) (waiving court rule barring admission to applicants who have
been convicted of a felony of moral turpitude, and admitting applicant who had been
convicted thirteen years earlier of felony conspiracy to distribute cocaine and various
misdemeanors, while minimally noting applicant's lack of candor).
34 Carr, supra note 2, at 383-84 ("The current majority approach of presumptive
disqualification attempts to strike a balance among several competing concerns:
protecting the public, safeguarding the image of the legal profession, and allowing a
fully rehabilitated individual the opportunity to serve the community in the capacity
of his or her choice.").
36 See id. at 384. Some courts employ a "two-step inquiry":
We first consider whether the applicant has satisfied the burden of proving
complete rehabilitation from the character deficits that led to the
commission of the crime. If not, our inquiry ends and we will deny the
application. If the applicant proves complete rehabilitation, we then decide
whether the applicant has otherwise demonstrated present good moral
character.
In re King, 136 P.3d 878, 882 (Ariz. 2006) (denying admission to applicant who had
committed attempted murder using a firearm almost twenty years earlier).
36 Carr, supra note 2, at 386 (quoting In re Cason, 294 S.E.2d 520, 522-23 (Ga.
1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. (noting that examiners
"assess whether the problems of the past continue and, if they do not, whether the
applicant's life has changed in ways that suggest the problems are unlikely to recur"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
37 NCBE GUIDE, supra note 21, 15, at viii; see, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 36(b)(4);
MONT. R.P. COMM. ON CHAR. & FIT. § 4(c).
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In effect, the difficulty of establishing rehabilitation and
therefore good moral character "is determined by the gravity of
the past criminal conduct."38
As courts have admitted frankly, "[i]n the case of extremely
damning past misconduct,.. . a showing of rehabilitation may be
virtually impossible to make.
39
III. THE PUZZLING RISE OF MODERN CHARACTER REVIEW
This part documents the troubling rise in character
screening for past criminal conduct. It reveals an increase of
puzzling proportions over the last quarter century. Before we
turn to the numbers, however, the following section briefly
describes the general methodology for compiling and coding the
cases and offers some cautionary remarks concerning the data.
A. Methodology and Disclaimers
This research builds on Professor Rhode's seminal work in
this area. 40 In doing so, it briefly compares her half-century's
worth of data to this Article's (nearly) quarter-century's worth.
George Blum's annotation greatly assisted my research. 41 Those
citations were then supplemented through searches on Westlaw's
electronic database. It still should be noted that it is quite
possible that a few opinions were not found. If that in fact is the
case, it fortunately does not affect my conclusions; indeed, more
cases would corroborate them further.42 With respect to the
38 In re King, 136 P.3d at 882.
39 Id. (quoting In re Mathews, 462 A.2d 165, 176 (N.J. 1983) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); In re T.J.S., 692 A.2d 498, 502 (N.H. 1997) (quoting In re Mathews,
462 A.2d at 176); see also In re Dortch, 486 S.E.2d 311, 320 (W. Va. 1997) ("[W]e
agree with the majority of states that an applicant who has previously been
convicted of a felony or other serious crime carries a heavy burden of persuading this
Court that he presently possesses good moral character sufficient to be invited into
the legal community of this State.").
40 See generally Rhode, supra note 8.
41 See generally George L. Blum, Criminal Record as Affecting Applicant's Moral
Character for Purposes of Admission to the Bar, 3 A.L.R.6TH 49 (2005).
42 See infra Parts IV-V. In short, even if there were more (discernible) character
opinions, and even if in those opinions state supreme courts admitted the applicants,
it still would mean that committees are denying higher numbers of applicants. See
also infra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining the skewed reporting of
admissions and denials).
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cases in general, however, there are several reasons to use these
numbers cautiously: "First, unless bar admission authorities
seek to block an applicant's admission on moral character
grounds, the result of the moral character assessment is
generally not reported .... Second, courts are often cursory in
describing the underlying facts and in offering the rationales for
their decisions in moral character cases."43  Indeed, many
published decisions provide little-to-no facts or law.44
Furthermore, for comparison purposes, there are also
internal reasons to view these numbers with caution. The first
fifty years' worth of comparison derives exclusively from another
author's published work. Among other difficulties, our collection
and categorization may not match perfectly.45 As we will see, the
resonating points do not hinge on such potentialities, but they
should be kept in mind.
43 Michael K. McChrystal, A Structural Analysis of the Good Moral Character
Requirement for Bar Admission, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 67, 69-70 (1984).
44 See, e.g., In re Sanderson, 875 A.2d 702, 702-03 (Md. 2005) (ordering
admission without listing underlying facts); see also In re Brown, 895 A.2d 1050,
1062-63 (Md. 2006) (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (implying that many, if not most, of the
sixty-five Maryland character cases in the last thirty years were disposed of by a
brief order).
45 I have tried to alleviate this problem by conforming my own results to
Professor Rhode's presentation and categorization.
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B. Results
TABLE ONE: PUBLISHED OPINIONS INVOLVING CRIMINAL RECORD CHARACTER
REVIEW, 1931 TO 197146
Admitted Denied Remanded Total
Cases
Criminal
Record* 3 7 0 10
Felonies 1 2 0 3
Non-Felonies 2 4 0 6
Unspecified 0 1 0 1
Additional
Factors** 0 4 0 4
* Criminal record,
charges, and
convictions. 47
for present purposes, includes arrests,
indictments, regardless of ultimate
"*Additional factors are any instances of non-criminal
misconduct, the most frequent of which is alleged lack of
candor during the screening process.
46 As indicated above, tables one and two use Professor Rhode's data; the format
for all three tables was adapted from her Tables 5 and 6. See Rhode, supra note 8, at
537 tbls.5 & 6.
47 It is not entirely clear, however, that Professor Rhode's study uses the same
definition as is being used in the present study. See infra Table Three; see also Blum,
supra note 41, at 49 n.2 (using the same definition). This definition, of course,
excludes conduct that may be criminal in nature but is not accompanied at least by
an arrest. See, e.g., In re Mustafa, 631 A.2d 45, 46-48 (D.C. 1993) (denying
admission to applicant who converted funds in his law school's moot court account
approximately three years earlier; noting that, although applicant admitted to the
wrongdoing, he had not been arrested).
1048 [Vol. 82:1037
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TABLE TWO: PUBLISHED OPINIONS INVOLVING CRIMINAL RECORD CHARACTER
REVIEW, 1972 TO 198248
Admitted Denied Remanded Total
Cases
Criminal
Record* 13 12 2 27
Felonies 3 1 2 6
Non-Felonies 3 3 0 6
Unspecified 7 8 0 15
Additional
Factors** 6 8 1 15
* Criminal record, for present purposes, includes arrests,
charges, and indictments, regardless of ultimate
convictions.
"Additional factors are any instances of non-criminal
misconduct, the most frequent of which is alleged lack of
candor during the screening process.
48 See supra note 46.
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TABLE THREE: PUBLISHED OPINIONS INVOLVING CRIMINAL RECORD
CHARACTER REVIEW, 1983 TO 200649
Admitted Denied Remanded Total
Cases
Criminal
Record* 25 60 3 88
Felonies 8 26 1 35
Misdemeanors 2 7 0 9
Unspecified 15 27 2 44
Additional
Factors** 7 45 0 52
* Criminal record,
charges, and
convictions.
for present purposes, includes arrests,
indictments, regardless of ultimate
**Additional factors are any instances of non-criminal
misconduct, the most frequent of which is alleged lack of
candor during the screening process.
49 These numbers do not include cases in which the underlying criminal conduct
was not at issue. Such cases could include, for example, a remand to rule on the
issue for the first time, or the violation of a local rule that required any applicant
who had been admitted in another state to be in good standing in that state at the
time of application. E.g., In re Adornato, 301 F. Supp. 2d 416, 418 (D.V.I. 2004)
(denying admission to applicant who had been admitted in another state, but then
was disbarred in that state); Ex parte Wilkerson, 758 So. 2d 544, 548-49 (Ala. 1999)
(ordering Alabama State Bar to rule for the first time). It is unclear whether
Professor Rhode's numbers include such cases.
Three other clarifications should be made. First, as in Professor Rhode's study,
remands with instructions to admit are coded as admitted. Second, cases are not
double-counted within the same jurisdiction. If (as happens often) the applicant
reapplies after a denial of admission, only the most recent published decision-
whether that disposition is to admit, deny, or remand-is counted. Finally,
suspended or disbarred attorneys' recertification determinations are not counted.
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C. Potential Reasons for the Rise
There are numerous potential explanations for the marked
increase in character review over the last quarter century. 50
Such explanations might include rises in the following: (1) the
general population; (2) "flexible" admission standards that may
give "problem" applicants more hope, causing them to apply more
frequently than in the past;51 (3) crime rates;5 2 (4) the bar's
protectionism and sensitivity to professional reputation;53
(5) reported cases generally; and (6) the use or thoroughness of
background checks. Indeed, even the Watergate scandal may
have had an effect on the sharp rise since the 1970s-by the
expansive push for more ethical regulation in its aftermath. 54
The most obvious contributing factor to the increase,
however, is the significant rise in lawyers and bar applicants. In
1985, for example, there were 655,191 lawyers, with a population
to lawyer ratio of 360:1. 55 By 2000, there were 1,066,328 lawyers,
with a population to lawyer ratio of 264:1.56 Similar growth rates
occurred over a significant portion of Professor Rhode's study as
well. 57
The point, however, is not to control for variables, crunch the
numbers, and determine error rates; the point is much less
complex: The problem has gotten worse, not better. The
numbers show that in the first half-century's worth of data (1931
through 1982), there were a total of thirty-seven reported cases
involving criminal record character review. My study shows
eighty-eight cases in the last twenty-four years, which is more
5o See supra Table Three. I again thank Rick Fraser, J.D.[M.B.A. Candidate,
University of Chicago, for his helpful data analysis.
51 See, e.g., Carr, supra note 2, at 368 (discussing an apparent shift to "flexible"
character review standards).
52 Cf. Dzienkowski, supra 19, at 940 (estimating that a recent rise in criminal
record disclosure on law school applications "is due in part to raising the age for
consumption of alcohol and the recent increase in the war on drugs").
53 See infra Parts IV-V.
54 See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 12, at 237 ("Indeed, after Watergate, legal
ethics became almost an industry in itself.").
55 Clara N. Carson & Barbara A. Curran, Am. Bar Found., Growth and Gender
Diversity: A Statistical Profile of the Legal Profession in 2000, RESEARCHING LAW,
Winter 2005, at 1 tbl.1.
56 Id.
57 See id. (noting, for example, that numbers roughly doubled between 1960 and
1985).
2008] 1051
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
than twice the amount in less than half the time.58 The data also
show a huge time lapse between the date of applicants' criminal
conduct and the date of application and a two-to-one ratio of
denials to admissions, which are discussed below.
IV. ILLUSTRATIONS OF MODERN CHARACTER REVIEW IN THEORY
AND APPLICATION
The following Charts illustrate that modern character
screening is both unrealistic and perverse. As currently applied,
two related factors-the seriousness of the past criminal activity
and rehabilitation-lead to these bizarre results: "[I]n the case of
extremely damning past misconduct,... a showing of
rehabilitation may be virtually impossible to make. ' 59 In other
words, the "weight of the added burden of demonstrating
complete rehabilitation is determined by the gravity of the past
criminal conduct."60
Thus, the worse the past crime, the higher the requisite
showing of present good moral character. This novel
requirement-one that is unprecedented in moral philosophy-is
unrealistic because few, if any, human beings can meet the high
character threshold actually applied.61  Furthermore, it is
perverse because the few that actually do meet the threshold-or
at least come closer than admitted attorneys-nevertheless are
denied admission. It is unfortunate indeed that such
exceptionally virtuous applicants are not allowed to practice
law.62 Finally, their exclusion may deprive the profession of a
58 For a listing of the criminal conduct involved, the time elapsed since the date
of applicants' convictions, and the additional factors cited, see Appendices One
through Three below.
59 See cases cited supra note 39.
60 In re King, 136 P.3d 878, 882 (Ariz. 2006).
61 In fact, the bar treats many of these applicants unfairly by nitpicking at any
misstep in their post-criminal behavior. The most common, and often technical,
misstep is alleged lack of candor on the applicants' law school application or during
the screening process concerning the underlying criminal misconduct. See, e.g., In re
Wright, 690 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (denying admission to applicant
and noting that "[i]n his application ... Wright represented that he was charged
with possession of .25 gram[s] of heroin [when iun fact he pleaded guilty to
possession of. 65 gram [s]" (emphasis added)); infra Part IV.C.
62 See, e.g., infra Part IV.B.3, Chart Three, and Part IV.C; see also Carr, supra
note 2, at 370 (noting that, as a result of the exclusionary practices generally, "the
community may be denied the service of an active and dedicated individual who,
quite possibly, has learned from past mistakes and who may now be more committed
than many to ensuring that justice is served").
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uniquely beneficial perspective--one that offers, among other
traits, an insider's understanding of the criminal justice system
and the client's point of view.
A. Methodology
The methodology is rather uncomplicated, and it at first
mimics the current character inquiry.63 The dots or arrows
represent morally relevant events. I use the word "event" in the
hope of not offending moral philosophers, many of whom prefer
not to base normative theory in discrete actions. An event, then,
could represent evidence of a particular virtue or vice, among
other moral concepts. The inquiry focuses on all events before
time T, which is the date of application. I chose to end the
illustrations just before screening because, as we will see, courts
often misconstrue events during screening, and these subsequent
events are frequently unrelated to applicants' underlying
criminal record. The Charts also reflect a somewhat Aristotelian
ascension of character over an applicant's lifespan.64
63 See, e.g., Banks McDowell, The Usefulness of "Good Moral Character," 33
WASHBURN L.J. 323, 326 (1994).
Many, if not most, people are usually of good moral character, but not
always .... They range along a continuum, usually acting above minimum
standards, but at times falling below. Those who assess moral character
are asked to make a global judgment, applying a complex set of criteria to
reach a black and white, either-or decision.
Id.
64 I balked at placing babies and young children in a low moral dimension,
however, for hopefully obvious reasons. The long ascension after "bad" character
events represents not only the necessary improvement in moral character, but also
the necessary temporal distance from the negative event. Both factors-
rehabilitation and length of time since misconduct-play a key role in assessing
character. See, e.g., NCBE GUIDE, supra note 21, 15, at viii (listing factors); supra
Part II.
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B. Character Review in Application and Theory
CHART ONE: APPLICANTS POSSESSING "GOOD" MORAL CHARACTER
UNDER THE CURRENT APPROACH
Good Moral
Character
Red-Flagged
Character
Bad Character
MORALLY RELEVANT EVENTS IN APPLICANT'S LIFE
PRIOR TO SCREENING
0 Applicant One: Questionable but Good Moral Character
0 Applicant Two: Good Moral Character
------ 0 Applicant Three: Good Moral Character (The "Holmesian Bad Man"')
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CHART Two: APPLICANTS POSSESSING BAD BUT
"REHABILITATED" MORAL CHARACTER (IN THEORY) UNDER THE CURRENT
APPROACH
6 5
Moral Saints
Supererogatory/
66
Super-Virtuous
Good Moral
Character
Red-Flagged
Character
Bad Character
K>r
MORALLY RELEVANT EVENTS IN APPLICANT'S LIFE
PRIOR TO SCREENING
* Applicant Four: Formerly Bad but "Rehabilitated" Character Despite
Serious Criminal Record
....-. • Applicant Five: Formerly Bad but "Rehabilitated" Character Despite
Horrendous Criminal Record
65 This Chart is marked "in theory" because most, if not all, human behavior
falls short.
66 Supererogatory acts are those above and beyond the call of moral duty. See,
e.g., DAVID HEYD, SUPEREROGATION: ITS STATUS IN ETHICAL THEORY 1 (1982).
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CHART THREE: APPLICANTS POSSESSING "BAD" MORAL CHARACTER
UNDER THE CURRENT APPROACH
Moral Saints
Supererogatory/
Super-Virtuous
Good Moral
Character
Red-Flagged
Character
Bad Character
MORALLY RELEVANT EVENTS IN APPLICANT'S LIFE
PRIOR TO SCREENING
-* Applicant Six: Bad Character in Light of Serious Criminal Record
....-. 0 Applicant Seven: Bad Character in Light of Horrendous Criminal
Record
C. Preliminary Conclusions
The point of the preceding illustrations is not only to criticize
enforcement, because such a limited criticism would be
incomplete. An objector could concede that enforcement is failing
while legitimately maintaining that the applicants in Chart
Three should be denied admission. The solution would not be to
"open the floodgates," but to extend enforcement to those who
admittedly are falling below the screening radar (such as
Applicants Two and Three in Chart One). The criticism,
however, properly goes beyond inadequate enforcement.
The more important problem is that these applicants clearly
should have been admitted.67 In re King is the prototypical
example of the problem. 68  First, the applicant presented
67 Indeed, they arguably are more deserving of admission than the applicants
passing the standard screening. See supra Chart One (listing, among other admitted
applicants, the "Holmesian bad man," who had never engaged in a morally good act
in his life). In Chart Three, for example, Applicants Six and Seven would not be
admitted even though they have better moral character than Applicants One
through Three in Chart One, who would be admitted.
6s 136 P.3d 878, 886 (Ariz. 2006) (denying admission to an applicant who had
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countless and consistent letters, witnesses, and affidavits
attesting to his present good moral character. Second, and even
more remarkably, he had been admitted and practiced law "in
good standing with the Texas Bar [since 1994] and ha[d] never
been the subject of a disciplinary grievance or sanction. '69
The court nevertheless refused to admit the applicant,
stressing that in light of his "extremely damning past
misconduct.., a showing of rehabilitation may be virtually
impossible to make. 70 In convincing itself that the applicant had
failed to make this "virtually impossible" showing, the court
proceeded to engage in a hyper-technical inquisition of the
applicant's behavior. Unsurprisingly, it managed to convince
itself that this "impossible" showing had not been met relying on
inconsistencies in the applicant's recounting of the offense
(notwithstanding the fact that the applicant did not remember
the events at issue because he undisputedly had been
intoxicated-to the point of having to be virtually carried by
officers at the time of the crime). The court also claimed that the
applicant had not received enough alcohol counseling in the
twenty-eight years since the crime.71
Unfortunately, this hyper-technical fetish for trivialities in
applicants' lives is not confined to one case. The cases are replete
with instances of exaggerated inconsistencies and harsh
condemnations of morally ambiguous events. 72 Appendix I lists
committed attempted murder using a firearm twenty-eight years earlier).
69 Id. at 887 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 882 (majority opinion) (quoting In re Mathews, 462 A.2d 165, 176 (N.J.
1983)); see also id. ("The weight of the added burden of demonstrating complete
rehabilitation is determined by the gravity of the past criminal conduct."); In re
Gossage, 5 P.3d 186, 203 (Cal. 2000) (denying admission to applicant who had
committed voluntary manslaughter and noting that he failed to sustain the "heavy
burden of proving his own rehabilitation"); In re Dortch, 486 S.E.2d 311, 320 (W. Va.
1997) ("[Wle agree with the majority of states that an applicant who has previously
been convicted of a felony or other serious crime carries a heavy burden of
persuading this Court that he presently possesses good moral character sufficient to
be invited into the legal community of this State.").
71 See In re King, 136 P.3d at 886.
72 See, e.g., In re Hamm, 123 P.3d 652, 662 (Ariz. 2005); see also id. at 658
("Indeed, we are aware of no instance in which a person convicted of first-degree
murder has been admitted to the practice of law."); In re T.J.S., 692 A.2d 498, 502
(N.H. 1997) (denying applicant in part because his description of his eleven-year-old
convictions was "too articulate, glib and adept at explaining away his past
behavior"); In re Wright, 690 P.2d 1134, 1135, 1137 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (denying
admission to applicant who was convicted of second-degree murder and possession of
heroine approximately ten years earlier and citing a lack of remorse and alleged
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sixty denials of admission in the last twenty-four years; a
denounced technicality or moral ambiguity can be found in
nearly every one of them.73  This intellectual dishonesty is
unbecoming of the bar.7 4  It is quite obvious that even an
applicant who had managed to achieve mythical perfection would
have been denied admission.75
Moreover, requiring moral sainthood is not necessarily
desirable. A prominent philosopher has argued, for example,
that people generally neither want their friends to be, nor their
children to become, moral saints.7 6 Furthermore, it is unclear
whether a true moral saint would choose to become a lawyer;
presumably, she would do so only if taking the time to become a
lawyer would result in the optimum amount of good to others-
and that is not a likely scenario. Finally, one might well wonder
whether a moral saint would make a good lawyer. 77
unauthorized practice of law). In In re Hamm, the court cited, among other
questionable factors, an alleged instance of plagiarism of a Supreme Court case in
the applicant's brief to the court. A review of the opinion and the source of the
alleged plagiarism-in addition to the standard legal practice of liberally borrowing
from language in cases-leaves one wholly unconvinced that the applicant
plagiarized. See In re Hamm, 123 P.3d at 661.
73 It is true, however, that many of these cases contain misconduct that is not
trivial or ambiguous. Even in those cases, however, important factors-like
successful rehabilitation and community service-are ignored or discounted.
74 Cf., e.g., Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2005) (criticizing the Board of
Immigration Appeals and an immigration judge for intellectual dishonesty and
arbitrariness in making credibility determinations and denying asylum
applications); infra Part V. Because of the obvious interrelation in these matters, my
use of the term "bar" includes the "bench" as well.
75 See In re Dortch, 486 S.E.2d at 321 ("Though Mr. Dortch may have
demonstrated that he has been rehabilitated, we believe the horrendous crime of
which he was the prime conspirator outweighs his present good deeds. Indeed, the
magnitude of his crimes constitutes an 'indelibly negative mark' on this applicant's
record." (quoting In re Avcollie, 637 A.2d 409, 412 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993))); infra
Part V; see also In re Hamm, 123 P.3d at 658 ("Indeed, we are aware of no instance
in which a person convicted of first-degree murder has been admitted to the practice
of law.").
76 See Susan Wolf, Moral Saints, 79 J. PHIL. 419, 431-34 (1982) (arguing that
moral saints, among other problematic traits, would be single-minded and
uninteresting). She also notes that it is unclear "whether there are any moral
saints." Id. at 419. Mahatma Gandhi and Mother Teresa are perhaps the only
popular images, and few choose to follow their example.
77 The question is more provocative than meritorious: As noted above, for one,
an applicant who has overcome a criminal past might bring uniquely good qualities
to the practice.
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With these perverse features of character review in mind,
the following section discusses the strength of its underlying
justifications.
V. THE MERIT OF MODERN CHARACTER REVIEW
This part addresses many, if not most, of the arguments for
character screening. Overwhelmingly, it concludes that
character screening is meritless. Its one meritorious feature is
discussed last, because it points us in the right direction for the
future of character screening in the Conclusion.
A. Problems and False Justifications
1. Self-Image: A Shallow Justification
[A] consideration should be the reputation of the bar. If the
crime is truly shocking, a court should deny admission-even if
it concludes that the applicant has completely turned around-
out of a decent respect for public opinion. The mass murderer
Ted Bundy was once a law student. If he had won release from
prison instead of being executed, are there any circumstances
under which he might have been admitted to the bar? I hope
not.
78
Undisputedly, character review is supposed to be concerned
solely with present good moral character. 79 A review of the cases
denying admission makes this claim untenable in reality. 0 The
median number of years since denied applicants' last offense is
nine years, with the mean over ten years.81 The median number
of years since admitted applicants' last offense is also nine years,
with the mean over nine years.8 2 This fact, in and of itself,
78 Stephen Gillers, The Prudent Jurist, LEGAL AFF., May/June 2004, http://
www.legalaffairs.org/issuesfMay-June-2004/pj-mayjun04.msp. The mass-murderer
hypothetical is a common argument for screening.
79 See supra Part II.
80 See infra Appendix I (listing circumstances of the sixty published denials of
admission over the last quarter century).
81 The average is 10.27 years (N = 56). See infra Appendix I. Four cases did not
list the years elapsed since date of conviction or (if no conviction) date of offense. See
infra Appendix I. In general, the overall time in years would be slightly higher,
because applicants usually are not convicted until months or years after the date of
their offense.
82 The average is 9.5 (N = 24). See infra Appendix II. One case did not list the
years elapsed since date of conviction or date of offense. See infra Appendix II.
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suggests perversity.83 A crucial factor in assessing rehabilitation
and good moral character is the amount of time since the
criminal conduct.8 4  We should expect, then, that admitted
applicants would have longer periods without event.
Yet, the years elapsed are virtually identical.8 5 Clearly,
another factor-the seriousness and nature of the offense-is
doing the lion's share of the work. That is because the worse the
crime, the more likely it offends the bar's reputation and self-
image.8 6  Furthermore, this fact partially suggests an
explanation for the bar's pitiful forgiveness rate (i.e., that
applicants are more than twice as likely to be denied admission
in a published opinion). As Table Three shows, applicants over
the last quarter century have been denied sixty times, while
being admitted only twenty-five times.8 7  Published opinions-
public opinions-are not where applicants want to be. It is
reasonable to suspect that the bar routinely admits "problem"
applicants under the radar.88 The problem applicants who are
83 See, e.g., In re Haukebo, 352 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. 1984) ("[B]ecause the
evaluation is to be made of the applicant's present moral character, any pattern of
immoral behavior must be sufficiently continuous or current to permit a reasonable
inference that similar conduct can currently occur or may likely occur in the future."
(citing In re Dileo, 307 So. 2d 362 (La. 1975))).
84 See supra Part II and note 83. This factor is in addition to applicant's age at
the time of the conduct.
88 Actually, the number in years is higher for denials, but the numbers are so
close, and given the variation in sample sizes, there is no statistical difference
between admissions and denials. The median for all of the cases, including the three
remands, is nine as well, and the average is 9.90 (N = 82). The standard deviation
for the Deny group is 6.72 years. For the Admit group, it is 4.61 years. A two-sample
t-test shows a t-statistic of 0.58 and a corresponding p-value of 0.57. In other words,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two means are equal at the 0.05 level.
86 See Rhode, supra note 8, at 512.
To prevent or deter individuals from entering a profession in order to
promote the reputation, autonomy, or monopoly of existing members is
troubling on constitutional as well as public policy grounds. Taken to its
logical extreme, this rationale would support exclusion of any applicant
whose conduct the local bar deemed unbecoming or likely to taint its public
image. Particularly in a profession charged with safeguarding the rights of
the unpopular, the price of such unbounded licensing discretion could be
substantial.
Id.
87 See supra Part III.B.3.
88 This assumption is consistent with our experiences in Arizona, as well as the
judicially noticeable facts that such large numbers of Americans have been arrested
for or convicted of at least one crime (e.g., DUI/DWI or drug offenses) and all
Americans arguably have committed at least some moral misconduct, yet the total
number of moral character opinions is relatively low (involving significantly less
1060
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not admitted this way, however, have to resort to appeal to the
state supreme court. There, the applicants risk a disposition in a
published opinion. When that occurs, it is little wonder that the
denial rate is so high: The bar is making an official, public
statement concerning its integrity and priesthood.
8 9
Thus, what the bar is really concerned with is "reputable
character," not "good moral character."90  Reputable character-
the reputation of one's character in the relevant community-
obviously is not equivalent to good moral character: "A person
may have a good character but suffer from a bad reputation."91
Indeed, "a person may have a bad character but enjoy a good
reputation."92 The three charts above testify to these facts.
93 It
therefore is difficult-nearly impossible actually-to fathom how
the bar's inquiry bears a rational relationship to the fitness to
practice law.94
than five percent of all applicants). Nevertheless, it should be disclaimed that no
satisfactory study documents the number of "problem" applicants (assuming a
satisfactory definition of "problem") who have been admitted without published
opinions.
89 See Rhode, supra note 8, at 510 ("Bar rhetoric traditionally has cast lawyers
as 'sentinels' and 'high priests' at the portals of justice. That self-portrait demands at
least the pretense of purity.").
90 May, supra note 23, at 200-01; see, e.g., Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re M.L.B.,
766 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2000) (examining applicant's public reputation to determine
whether he had rehabilitated himself following his criminal conduct); In re Cason,
294 S.E.2d 520, 522 (Ga. 1982) ("For bar fitness purposes, rehabilitation is the
reestablishment of the reputation of a person by his or her restoration to a useful
and constructive place in society."); Elizabeth Gepford McCulley, Note, School of
Sharks? Bar Fitness Requirements of Good Moral Character and the Role of Law
Schools, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839, 865 (2001) (proposing several forms of
character review in order to increase "the public's image of lawyers").
9' May, supra note 23, at 200-01.
92 Id. at 201 (emphasis added); cf. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Daniel
Donno trans., Bantam Books 2003) (1532).
93 In Chart Three, for example, Applicants Six and Seven would not be admitted
even though they have better moral character than Applicants One through Three in
Chart One, who would be admitted.
94 Unless, of course, the bar ludicrously defines fitness to practice law as fitness
not to tarnish the bar's reputation by having engaged in certain types of criminal
activity many years earlier. See, e.g., McChrystal, supra note 43, at 88 n.91.
To permit a concern for the public image of the profession to stand as an
independent basis for denying bar admission on moral character grounds
substantially departs from the requirement that denial be based on conduct
rationally connected with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.
Adverse public reaction ... cannot be tantamount to unfitness to practice
law, if unfitness to practice law is to be defined in a principled (i.e.,
rational) way.
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This rabbit hole is deeper still. The bar is not concerned
with reputable character in any meaningful sense. As we have
seen, it routinely denies applicants of present reputable
character. 95 Such denials would be wholly arbitrary under a
reputable character standard. Instead, the bar is more concerned
with "reputable relational character"-that is, whether an
applicant's past conduct is consistent with the bar's perceived
self-image. 96  This outlandish definition reconciles the cases-
"fitness" to practice law is fitness to cohere with the bar's exalted
self-image. This shallow vanity is unbecoming of an otherwise
noble profession. 97
Id. The psychological effect of the bar's regime is also questionable:
It might be argued that people who think about legal careers at some
formative psychological moment abandon their hopes, perhaps even
unconsciously, because they realize that lawyers have high standards of
moral character but that they themselves have such moral deficiencies that
an alternative career, perhaps as a drug dealer or a physician in
Minnesota, [which dropped its good moral character requirement,] would
be more appropriate. The argument, in other words, is that the actual
operation of character and fitness standards is irrelevant-what matters is
the public perception. One could image such a mental process in the dream
world of the American Bar Association seventy-five years ago, but not in
our culture, not in a generation of L.A. Law watchers.
Baude, supra note 14, at 654.
95 These applicants present countless testimonials of their solid reputable
character, not only in the community generally, but in the legal community as well.
See supra Part IV.C; see also infra Appendix I (citing cases denying admission to
applicants).
96 An applicant whose misconduct is inconsistent with this pristine priesthood
of justice simply does not fit. Rhode, supra note 8, at 510; cf. In re Easton, 692 P.2d
592, 596 (Or. 1984) (per curiam) (denying applicant in part because he "holds a
consistently low and cynical opinion of lawyers and lawyers' conduct").
97 Professor Patrick Baude has suggested a stinging explanation for the
persistence of character screening, which he argues serves two covert goals:
On the one hand is the project of convincing potential customers that their
lawyers will not cheat or otherwise harm them. This is an essential part of
marketing any business: the contractor is bonded, the drug smuggler allows
on-site inspection, and the lawyer can, at least implicitly, draw upon the
public institutions regulating the bar to vouch for her integrity....
The other project is the Weberian enterprise of justifying the privileges of
lawyers in the political and economic sphere....
The practical success of lawyers is in part dependent on preventing the
public from seeing clearly the difference between the two projects .... The
rule, the rhetoric, and the image of "character and fitness" are each a
means of making these two distinct projects appear to be united. But a
large group cannot create illusions of this sort without coming to believe
them. And what a group comes to believe has a way of becoming true.
Baude, supra note 14, at 650 (emphasis added).
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2. The Displaced Values of Forgiveness and Redemption
The preceding data and conclusions reveal an impoverished
role for forgiveness and redemption. 98 "The concept that human
redemption is possible and valuable is both well established in
law and premised upon long-standing, even ancient traditions." 99
On the surface, courts repeatedly "have stated that no offense is
so grave as to preclude a showing of present moral fitness. 100
As they have (probably inadvertently) admitted, however,
"an applicant's subsequent exemplary behavior cannot lessen the
enormity of an earlier offense." 101 The Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia plainly tipped the bar's hand in its ruling:
"Though Mr. Dortch may have demonstrated that he has been
rehabilitated, we believe the horrendous crime of which he was
the prime conspirator outweighs his present good deeds. Indeed,
the magnitude of his crimes constitutes an 'indelibly negative
mark' on this applicant's record." 10 2  In fact, the bar's record
generally reveals a poor appreciation of the values of forgiveness
and redemption. 10 3 Moreover, it reveals a mistaken impression of
"indelibly" negative marks; vicious acts are not necessarily signs
of irreversibly evil character. 104
In sum, a profession that routinely denies applicants for
conduct that happened, on average, over nine years earlier-and
98 Carr, supra note 2, at 372 ("Our legal system, with its origins in the Judeo-
Christian ethos of repentance, forgiveness, and redemption, is not unforgiving.
Lawyers should not be less inclined to forgiveness than the law itself, especially
where rehabilitation appears to have been accomplished.").
99 In re Prager, 661 N.E.2d 84, 92 (Mass. 1996) (denying admission to applicant
who was convicted of four drug felonies relating to his large marijuana smuggling
operation approximately eight years earlier).
100 Id. at 91.
101 In re Krule, 741 N.E.2d 259, 265 (Ill. 2000) (denying admission to applicant
who was convicted of felony theft for an insurance fraud scheme approximately
thirteen years earlier, citing also a lack of candor in law school applications).
102 In re Dortch, 486 S.E.2d 311, 321 (W. Va. 1997) (quoting In re Avcollie, 637
A.2d 409, 412 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993)) (denying admission to applicant who was
convicted of second-degree murder, conspiracy, and attempted armed robbery
approximately twenty-three years earlier); see also In re Hamm, 123 P.3d 652, 658
(Ariz. 2005) ("Indeed, we are aware of no instance in which a person convicted of
first-degree murder has been admitted to the practice of law.").
103 See supra Table Three; infra Appendix I.
104 See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING
How GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007) (documenting the heavy impact of "situational
forces" on human misbehavior).
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often when applicants were fairly young-devalues forgiveness
and redemption. 1 5
3. Additional Condemnation: Arbitrariness, Class Oppression,
and Public Perception
The inconsistent and even arbitrary application of the
character standard has been well documented elsewhere. 0 6 The
standards are applied differently from state to state, within
states, and applicant to applicant. Furthermore, the bar has
managed somehow to overlook that "empirical research
establishes no correlation between 'problem' applications and
later disciplinary proceedings."' 0' 7 Although I fully agree with
these criticisms, I do not wish to rehash them here; they
currently are uncontested truths.
Several other negative attributes should be addressed
instead. First, emphasis on criminal records disproportionately
impacts certain racial groups and socioeconomic classes. To a
large extent, this problematic phenomenon is undisputed and
commonly known: "Empirical studies indicate that persons from
lower socioeconomic areas are more likely to be arrested than
persons living in higher income areas. Studies also note racial
differences in arrest rates for adults as well [as] juveniles."' 0 8
Second, these requirements-which are not limited to the
legal profession-often preclude felons from meaningful work.1°9
Effectively, they are permanent outcasts, but living and
struggling among us. Moreover, one might point out
argumentatively that if the bar really cared about the public, it
105 See supra Part V.A. 1 (listing the mean and median amounts of time between
conviction and date of opinion).
106 See May, supra note 23, at 190-91, 197-200; see also Baude, supra note 14,
at 650-51 (noting that Professor Rhode's conclusion "that the screening process is of
little or no use" has neither been seriously attacked nor refuted, and that "browsing
through current publications of the National Conference of Bar Examiners will
reveal that Professor Rhode's work is generally accepted as a valuable scholarly
study of the process rather than dismissed as a radical critique"); Rhode, supra note
8, at 529-46.
107 Roots, supra note 1, at 35 (citing D. Larkin Chenault, It Begins with
Character. .. , 77 MICH. B.J. 138, 139 (1998)); see also Rhode, supra note 8, at 555-
62 (citing studies).
108 Susan Saab Fortney, Law Student Admissions and Ethics-Rethinking
Character and Fitness Inquiries, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 983, 991 (2004) (footnotes
omitted) (citing studies).
109 See May, supra note 23, at 190-91, 193-94.
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would lower its exclusionary practice in order to help lower
crime: By employing felons, society reduces the criminal
recidivism rate. 110 In sum, then, character screening causes de
facto discrimination and may hurt society in other important
ways as well.
Finally, there is a false justification for character screening
that warrants only a cursory review and rebuttal. This
argument attempts to justify the current character screening
regime "by the widespread perception that a state-issued license
to practice law manifests state endorsement of character, and
that the licensed individual is a person of honesty and
integrity." ' While the argument may be facially appealing, it is
completely meritless in reality for at least three reasons: (1) the
bar itself creates any "widespread perception" that does exist,
and can disclaim it at any point, which is not likely to happen
any time soon; (2) there is little to no evidence of this widespread
perception in any event;11 2 and (3) the current screening regime
does not catch most of the problem applicants-indeed, as we saw
above, it often excludes applicants with particularly good present
moral character. Thus, the justification is either self-created and
self-perpetuated or nonexistent; either way, it is (an attempt at)
outright false advertising. And when this justification is
removed, we see that the current regime is arbitrary and
oppressive.
4. The Misplaced Legal Education Objection
I am troubled by a public institution that uses taxpayer dollars
to educate an individual who will have significant trouble in
obtaining bar membership. Also, it is easy to understand how
deans of a public school will go to great lengths to avoid adverse
publicity.113
The legal education objection goes something like the
following: Because the purpose of law schools is to train lawyers,
110 Id. at 187-88 (citing studies).
11 Carr, supra note 2, at 372-73 & n.26 (citing, but noting that this source is
more equivocal on the proposition, STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 554 (3d ed. 1992)).
112 Indeed, the evidence suggests the contrary. E.g., McCulley, supra note 90, at
839, 869 (noting the "decline in the public's perception of the morality of lawyers").
113 See Dzienkowski, supra note 19, at 937 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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law schools should not admit applicants who cannot be admitted
to the bar due to character screening concerns. The problem with
this argument is that it is nearly impossible to conclude that the
sole purpose of legal education is to make lawyers. Once that
truth is conceded, the objection loses its force. 114
Legal education does not exist merely for "Hessian" training
purposes. Harvard Law School-the second oldest, longest
running, and arguably the best law school in the country-
corroborated this fact in one of its first recruiting efforts: "The
design of this Institution is to afford a complete course of legal
education for gentlemen intended for the bar in any of the United
States; and elementary instruction for gentlemen not destined
for the bar, but desirous of qualifying themselves either for public
life, or for commercial business."'115 Furthermore, in many other
countries, law is not taught at trade schools, but as part of a
liberal arts education. 116
Indeed, any other concept of law effectively trivializes it. In
no other academic discipline (save, but to a lesser extent,
medicine) do we demand that graduates apply it in the market. 117
It is more than implicit in such an argument that law is
meaningless without clients. 118  It is, however, certainly
conceivable-perhaps even democratically required-that
citizens qua citizens should want to learn the laws of the land
114 See id. (acknowledging that "if a law school education has a benefit to a
student, regardless of whether or not that student joins a bar association, then the
character and fitness inquiry may be less important" (emphasis added)). It is ironic
that a law professor would have to ask such a question.
115 CATALOGUE OF THE OFFICERS AND STUDENTS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY FOR
THE ACADEMICAL YEAR 1838-9, at 28 (Folson, Wells, & Thurston 1838).
Furthermore, the first university "chair" in law was not established for today's trade
school purposes, but as part of a liberal arts education. See STEVENS, supra note 12,
at 4-5 (discussing the first American chair in law established at the University of
Virginia). Even back then, however, trade school roots were taking hold. See id. at 5
(discussing the university "mergers" between the "academic" and "practical" sides of
legal education).
116 Cf. STEVENS, supra note 12, at 4-5 (discussing the history of liberal legal
education in America and some of its European counterparts).
117 The mere thought of it must be terrifying-and perhaps even demeaning-to
philosophers (among many others).
118 Even conceding, arguendo, that law is useless without clients, the student
can be her own client. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 12, at 21 (suggesting that
approximately one-half of the impetus for the University of Georgia Law School was
to provide training for "young men who intend to devote themselves to the honorable
employment of cultivating the estates they inherit from their fathers," and noting
the same impetus at New York University).
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and the processes by which they are adopted and enforced.
Moreover, surely law has some significant academic usefulness in
and of itself. Again, its use in other countries-and our own 119-
as a liberal arts background testifies to that fact.
The point here is not to convince the reader that law should
be solely academic. It is not to win the academic answer for the
age-old question, "Was the law school essentially a professional
school, or was it instead an academic area of the university?"120
The point is much less ambitious: There is academic value in
legal education. The categorical arguments to the contrary are
mistaken, or at least overstated. 121 Thus, the legal education
objection logically does not preclude enrolling students who
desire a legal education without bar membership. 122
After the preceding arguments have been rejected, and the
discriminatory effect of character review flagged, the kernel of
merit in the system can finally be explored.
B. The Limited Merit of Character Screening
There is this much-and only this much-merit to the whole
system: Once corrupt or professionally deficient actors have
entered the legal profession, they often do a grave amount of
harm before they are brought before the attorney disciplinary
authorities. 123 Even then, they may not be disbarred the first
119 Yale, for instance, offered a Bachelor of Civil Laws in the late nineteenth
century. STEVENS, supra note 12, at 39. Today, most major universities offer
undergraduate legal education through pre-law, political science, and justice studies
curricula. See id. at 233 ("The idea of teaching law in the undergraduate degree as a
liberal subject-stressing its historical, philosophical, and social science aspects-
[has] achieved a new respectability.").
120 Id. at 135; see also McCulley, supra note 90, at 855.
121 Cf. STEVENS, supra note 12, at 135 (noting the belief-still held by many
educators-that the "law school ha[s] a moral duty to fulfill both functions"
(emphasis added)).
122 As noted in the Conclusion below, law schools still have a duty to apprise
problem applicants of the fact that they may be ineligible for bar admission because
most students, of course, attend law school with the intent to become licensed
attorneys.
123 I thank Andrew Kaufman, Harvard Law School, for reminding me of this sad
fact. See, e.g., COQUILLETrE, supra note 27, at 613-14 ("[O]nce a morally bad lawyer
has been detected and suspended, a lot of harm will have been done. In my
experience, the harm to clients and others by such a lawyer cannot be made up by
malpractice actions and money damages. Lives are well and truly ruined by such
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time through the disciplinary process, and more damage may
accrue to innocent clients until the second or third time. Thus,
character screening, in theory, could help to prevent these
walking travesties of justice from being admitted. 124
The problem is that we do not know how to do it. This
approach, for example, mandates prospective-as opposed to the
customarily reactive-law-abidingness investigations. Yet, there
is no evidence of our ability to predict the malpracticing
attorney.125 Perhaps someday we will have models to guide the
delicate inquiries necessary to predict future moral judgments
from past misconduct in different contexts, but today such
models are noticeably absent from the legal profession. 126
Moreover, as the questions on bar applications demonstrate,
prospective investigations are extremely destructive to
applicants' privacy. 127 Finally, we should not forget that it is the
bar that is charged with disciplining bad attorneys. It is difficult
to justify instrumentally punishing applicants-who have never
committed any attorney misconduct-because the bar's own
people.").
124 We must be careful always to take the public safety rationale with a grain or
two of salt. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 14, at 648 ("What is touted as consumer
protection-the admission process, restrictions on unauthorized practice, and
judicial oversight-is just a cleverly disguised guild arrangement."). Rhode states:
To prevent or deter individuals from entering a profession in order to
promote the reputation, autonomy, or monopoly of existing members is
troubling on constitutional as well as public policy grounds. Taken to its
logical extreme, this rationale would support exclusion of any applicant
whose conduct the local bar deemed unbecoming or likely to taint its public
image. Particularly in a profession charged with safeguarding the rights of
the unpopular, the price of such unbounded licensing discretion could be
substantial.
Rhode, supra note 8, at 512.
125 See Rhode, supra note 8, at 555-62 (citing numerous studies); see also Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Private Lives and Professional Responsibilities? The Relationship
of Personal Morality to Lawyering and Professional Ethics, 21 PACE L. REV. 365, 389
(2001) (arguing that the legal profession should focus on attorney discipline-not
character screening-and noting that "[piredictions in advance of how particular
people will behave later (are] notoriously unreliable, particularly when experts
disagree about how predictive and stable 'character' is, especially in an age of the
'post-modern' self' (footnote omitted)).
126 Given the highly situational nature of moral behavior, their development
will be difficult. See Deborah L. Rhode, Where Is the Leadership in Moral
Leadership?, in MORAL LEADERSHIP 23-33 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006).
127 Rhode, supra note 8, at 574-75. She also raises First Amendment and due
process concerns. Id. at 566-74.
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disciplinary enforcement is not what it should be. 128 A fair
solution seems to be more enforcement, not premature exclusion.
Therefore, Professor Rhode's recommendation over twenty
years ago-namely, dismantle character screening and reallocate
the saved resources to attorney disciplinary enforcement-rings
as true today as it did then. 129
CONCLUSION: PARTING ADVICE FOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE
CHARACTER REVIEW PROCESS
To note that the preceding discussion has been negative
would be an understatement. Its negativity in no way implies
that good moral character should not be promoted; it should be.
But promoted-not perverted, devalued, and misappropriated for
the bar's reputation and self-image. 130
To change the mood to a more positive one, the following
advice is offered to the participants in the process, namely
applicants, committees, courts, and law schools. Concededly,
there is little to offer applicants; they should stay out of trouble-
but they already have for years.13' The most important advice,
beyond doubt, is to disclose-in meticulous detail-everything
concerning criminal records. Committees and courts routinely
deny applicants in part for candor problems (whether actual or
misconstrued). 132
For the committees and courts, a compromise position is
offered. The proposed rule should read roughly: Applicants
convicted of a felony offense are ineligible to apply for admission
to the bar until the later of (a) five years from the date of
conviction or (b) completion of sentence, including probation or
128 See generally David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 799 (1992) (listing some of the flaws in the bar's self-regulated disciplinary
regime).
129 As noted above, the most likely reason that this approach has not been
implemented is its perceived "damage to the profession's image." Carr, supra note 2,
at 374; see also Rhode, supra note 8, at 585.
130 Cf., e.g., McDowell, supra note 63, at 334 (arguing that character screening
should be abandoned while maintaining that attorneys' actual good character should
be promoted).
131 See supra Part V.A.1.
132 See supra Part II (discussing factors in bar admissions); supra Table Three
(noting that alleged lack of candor during the screening process is an "additional
factor" in criminal record character reviews); infra Appendix I (listing lack of candor
as a factor in most denials of admission); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 8.1 (2003) (requiring truthfulness of bar applicants).
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parole. 133  Part (a) reflects a compromise by imposing a
categorical (yet generally reasonable) ban on admission for five
years after the applicants' date of felony conviction. It serves the
bar by assuring that applicants will not bring with them negative
publicity regarding recent criminal convictions; 34 it does not
disserve applicants seriously because five years approximates the
amount of time that should be needed to get their lives back in
order and complete law school.
Part (b) partially adopts the current regime. 135 That is, most
states render ineligible applicants who still are serving their
sentence, including probation or parole. As a practical matter,
current prisoners will not be able to apply for the bar (unless,
certain exceptions aside, they had graduated from an ABA-
accredited law school and taken the bar exam before being
imprisoned). The temporary preclusion of probationers and
parolees does come up, however, but it makes some sense.
Such applicants are subject to various restrictions on their
rights and liberties. 136 As a result, they would not have the same
range--certainly range of motion-as other attorneys. 137  That,
133 See, e.g., MONT. R.P. COMM. ON CHAR. AND FIT. § 4(h) ("An applicant found
guilty of a felony is conclusively presumed not to have present good moral character
and fitness. The presumption ceases upon completion of the sentence and/or period
of probation."). Some states effectively impose longer bans. See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R.
8.04(a) (barring admission to felons for five years after the completion of their
sentence); TEX. B. ADMISSION R. IV(d)(2). In their current form, these rules are
unsatisfactory because five years from the completion of sentence imposes an
unreasonably long waiting requirement. By the time of completion of probation or
parole, applicants have completed their time in prison (if any) and most have been
living as problem-free citizens for years. Indeed, the period of probation or parole
provides behavioral monitoring that non-felon applicants lack.
134 It also, of course, automatically screens those applicants-and only those
applicants-who cannot refrain from criminal activity over a significant period of
time.
135 As noted above, however, it is mitigated. See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 8.04(a)
(barring admission to felons for five years after the completion of their sentence);
TEX. B. ADMISSION R. IV(d)(2). Such rules often place an unreasonably long ban on
applicants. See supra note 133.
136 See, e.g., In re Dortch, 860 A.2d 346, 363 (D.C. 2004) (holding, alternatively,
that applicant was not "fit" to be admitted because he was still on parole).
137 Id. at 362.
Parolees are subject to ongoing official oversight and supervision,
restrictions on their activities, and reincarceration for violating the
conditions of their release. They remain subject to various civil disabilities
as well. In the District of Columbia and elsewhere, for example, a person on
parole for a felony offense is disqualified from serving as a juror.
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however, could be remedied by limiting the scope of
representation in writing; similar solutions are reached ethically
between attorneys and prospective clients everyday. The more
important problem would be the conflict of interest that would
arise if probationers and parolees were to practice criminal law.
It is quite reasonable to assume that such attorneys could not
advocate fully against the same officials (prosecutors and
probation officers), or at least the same departments, that
literally control whether they return to jail or prison. 138 This
concern, of course, is applicable only to criminal practice, and
even that conflict likely could be avoided by an expansion or
interpretation of Model Rule 1.7 to bar criminal practice
temporarily. 139
Finally, law schools should continue what they are doing-
nothing (or nearly nothing).140 Although most law schools ask
criminal record questions on the law school application, it is the
rare law school that actually screens for character.141 With
respect to questioning, however, law schools should ask only
those questions designed to ensure institutional safety and
academic integrity.1 42 Relatedly, and obviously, they should not
ask questions seeking information that they do not use. 143
138 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2003) (barring representation
whenever "there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to ... a third person or by
a personal interest of the lawyer"); see also In re Culpepper, 770 F. Supp. 366, 374
(E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding parolee ineligible for admission in part out of similar
concern).
139 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7. Of course, the Model
Rules disfavors restrictions on the right to practice in other contexts. Id. R. 5.6.
140 Their inaction is justified:
Schools are reluctant to make a serious effort to condition entrance on
character requirements for a variety of justifiable reasons: first, the
difficulty of obtaining sufficient reliable evidence; second, the possibility
that character might change or be improved in the course of professional
education; and finally, a profession's expertise may be studied and
mastered by those who have no intention of ever practicing.
McDowell, supra note 63, at 328.
141 See, e.g., Dzienkowski, supra note 19, at 923, 940; McCulley, supra note 90,
at 855.
142 See Rhode, supra note 8, at 590 (noting that law schools' "institutional
concerns dictate a certain degree of scrutiny, irrespective of what the bar formally
requires").
143 Dzienkowski, supra note 19, at 933. Furthermore, to elicit information that
is used, law schools should be (more) careful not to draft ambiguous or otherwise
inept questions. See id.
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Furthermore, they should warn applicants that (1) bar
committees may deny admission to applicants on the basis of
their criminal record,144 and (2) lack of candor on a law school
application regarding criminal record is often grounds, or partial
grounds, for denial of admission to the bar. 145 Again, to their
credit, "most law schools tend to exclude consideration of
character and fitness except in . . . serious cases."'146 They should
continue to do so and not let the bar's poor example influence
their practices. As with the profession, law school reputation in
and of itself does not justify applicant screening or, even worse,
denial of admission. Law schools (and the bar) can take some
comfort in knowing that "[1]aw schools' academic criteria already
exclude a large percentage of serious offenders."'147
With that said, we have exhausted the discernable bases of
character review. It should proceed no further than the foregoing
compromises, and even the compromises should not be
implemented as means of grounding and legitimating the regime,
but as steps toward dismantling it. The time has come-
belatedly-to forgive and forget this troubling mark on the legal
profession's good moral character.
144 See, e.g., id. at 936 ("Individuals with serious character issues may decide
not to invest the time and money necessary to attend and complete law school.").
145 See id. at 952-53, 55 (drafting a sample warning). Some law school
applications properly warn applicants that, "'when in doubt'" regarding a question's
scope, "'err on the side of full disclosure.'" Id. at 953 (quoting a University of
Michigan Law School application).
146 See id. at 940.
147 Rhode, supra note 8, at 590.
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APPENDIX I: APPLICANTS DENIED ADMISSION FOR BAD
CHARACTER: 1983 TO 2006
1. In re G.L.S., 745 F.2d 856, 859-60 (4th Cir. 1984)
(denying federal admission because applicant had been
convicted of bank robbery sixteen years earlier, and also
citing lack of candor relating to his time spent in prison).
2. In re King, 136 P.3d 878, 884, 886 (Ariz. 2006) (denying
admission to applicant who was convicted of attempted
murder using a firearm twenty-eight years earlier, and
also citing lack of candor and remorse).
3. In re Hamm, 123 P.3d 652, 662 (Ariz. 2005) (denying
admission to applicant who had committed first-degree
murder during a drug deal thirty-one years earlier,
citing also lack of candor and remorse).
4. In re Gossage, 5 P.3d 186, 202-03 (Cal. 2000) (denying
admission to applicant who had committed the
voluntary manslaughter of his sister twenty-five years
earlier in addition to sixteen other convictions or
unprosecuted crimes occurring as recently as eighteen
years earlier, and also citing lack of candor for failure to
disclose thirteen of his seventeen convictions).
5. In re Menna, 905 P.2d 944, 945 (Cal. 1995) (denying
admission to disbarred, out-of-state attorney for "felony
convictions for theft of client funds, failure to file a state
income tax return, and manufacture of
methamphetamine" over ten years earlier).
6. Seide v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 782 P.2d 602, 603, 605
(Cal. 1989) (denying admission because applicant had
several arrests during law school and one conviction for
drug trafficking shortly thereafter, although applicant
had a clean record for seven years by the time of
decision).
7. In re Dortch, 860 A.2d 346, 361-63 (D.C. 2004) (denying
admission to applicant who had committed second-
degree murder, attempted armed robbery, and
conspiracy thirty years earlier, and holding alternatively
that applicant was not "fit" to be admitted because he
was still serving parole time).
8. In re Wells, 815 A.2d 771, 772 (D.C. 2003) (denying
admission to suspended, out-of-state attorney who had
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been convicted of misdemeanor battery approximately
sixteen years earlier).
9. In re Demos, 579 A.2d 668, 673-74 (D.C. 1990) (en banc)
(denying admission to applicant who had been convicted
of contempt and investigated for unauthorized practice
of law approximately five years earlier).
10. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re T.J.F., 770 So. 2d 676, 678-79
(Fla. 2000) (denying applicant who had been charged
with theft three years earlier, citing also lack of candor
and additional, though uncharged, "unlawful" conduct).
11. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re M.L.B., 766 So. 2d 994, 994-
96 (Fla. 2000) (denying admission to applicant who had
been convicted of grand theft from his employer right
before entering law school, citing also lack of candor).
12. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re G.J.G., 709 So. 2d 1377, 1381
(Fla. 1998) (per curiam) (denying applicant who had
been charged, but not convicted, of aggravated assault
approximately six years earlier, and also citing
additional factors including lack of candor and cheating
on bar examination nine years earlier).
13. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re R.B.R., 609 So. 2d 1302,
1302-04 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (denying admission to
applicant who had been convicted of using a telephone to
facilitate the commission of a felony approximately
thirteen years earlier, and also citing numerous
instances of lack of candor).
14. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re R.D.I., 581 So. 2d 27, 30-31
(Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (denying applicant who had
been charged with larceny and likely had engaged in
other criminal activity approximately eleven years
earlier, citing also lack of candor).
15. In re Adams, 540 S.E.2d 609, 610 (Ga. 2001) (per
curiam) (denying admission to applicant who had been
convicted of misdemeanor battery and had been involved
in a separate instance of domestic violence
approximately thirteen years earlier, and also citing
lack of candor).
16. In re K.S.L., 495 S.E.2d 276, 277-78 (Ga. 1998) (per
curiam) (denying applicant who had been arrested for
entering cars with criminal intent to steal money
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approximately eight years before, citing additional factor
of alleged plagiarism of a law school paper).
17. In re J.W.N., 463 S.E.2d 114, 115-16 (Ga. 1995) (per
curiam) (denying applicant who had been convicted of
reckless driving, assault, and threatening phone calls,
among other instances of misconduct, approximately six
years earlier, and also citing questionable business
practices).
18. In re W.D.P., 91 P.3d 1078, 1079-80, 1092 (Haw. 2004)
(per curiam) (denying admission to out-of-state attorney
who had been convicted of "'feloniously engag[ing] in
lewd fondling or touching'" of his minor daughters
approximately seven years earlier, although his
conviction was reversed on appeal, citing also numerous
instances of alleged misconduct).
19. In re Krule, 741 N.E.2d 259, 265 (Ill. 2000) (denying
admission to applicant who had been convicted of felony
theft for an insurance fraud scheme approximately
thirteen years earlier, and also citing lack of candor in
law school applications).
20. In re Glenville, 565 N.E.2d 623, 627-29 (Ill. 1990)
(denying admission to applicant who had been convicted
of misdemeanor theft and had been arrested on several
other occasions approximately six years earlier, and also
citing applicant's alleged lack of candor).
21. In re Childress, 561 N.E.2d 614, 620-21 (Ill. 1990)
(denying applicant who had been convicted of rape and
robbery sixteen years earlier, and also citing lack of
candor regarding the convictions on law school
applications).
22. In re Peterson, 439 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Iowa 1989)
(denying admission to applicant who was convicted of
felony breaking and entering and possession of burglary
tools and misdemeanor assault approximately thirteen
years earlier, citing lack of candor regarding convictions
during screening process).
23. In re Vendt, 924 So. 2d 89, 89-90 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
(denying admission to applicant who was convicted of
"three misdemeanor charges-simple battery, criminal
mischief, and aggravated assault"-and was charged
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originally with second-degree murder approximately six
years ago).
24. In re Laughlin, 922 So. 2d 475, 476-77 (La. 2006) (per
curiam) (denying admission to applicant who was
convicted of driving while intoxicated and a felony drug
offense at least six years earlier, and also citing lack of
candor regarding offenses in his law school application).
25. In re Hinson-Lyles, 864 So. 2d 108, 111-12 (La. 2003)
(per curiam) (denying applicant who was convicted of
"two counts of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile and
one count of indecent behavior with a juvenile"
approximately four years earlier).
26. In re Brown, 895 A.2d 1050, 1057-59 (Md. 2006)
(denying admission to applicant who was convicted of
bank fraud approximately fifteen years earlier, and also
citing lack of candor).
27. In re Hyland, 663 A.2d 1309, 1310, 1317-18 (Md. 1995)
(denying admission to out-of-state attorney who, before
law school, "was convicted of fifteen counts of failure to
file state sales tax returns" approximately nine years
earlier, citing also lack of candor, among other factors).
28. In re Jeb F., 558 A.2d 378, 378-79 (Md. 1989) (denying
admission to applicant who had been convicted and later
absolved of all liability for armed robbery without
specifying date of original conviction).
29. In re Charles M., 545 A.2d 7, 12 (Md. 1988) (denying
applicant who was arrested for fraud by check
approximately eleven years earlier, and also citing
financial instability and lack of candor).
30. In re George B., 466 A.2d 1286, 1286 (Md. 1983)
(denying admission to applicant who was convicted of
attempted armed bank robbery over nine years earlier).
31. In re Admission to Bar of Commonwealth (Krohn), 828
N.E.2d 484, 487 (Mass. 2005) (denying admission to
applicant who had been convicted of felony conspiracy
and extortion approximately twenty-eight years earlier,
and also citing other alleged misconduct).
32. In re Prager, 661 N.E.2d 84, 86-87 (Mass. 1996)
(denying admission to applicant who had been convicted
of four drug felonies relating to his large marijuana
smuggling operation approximately eight years earlier).
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33. In re Noske, 470 N.W.2d 116, 116-18 (Minn. 1991)
(denying admission to applicant who had been convicted
of assault approximately one year earlier, and also citing
several instances of misconduct).
34. In re Brown, 467 N.W.2d 622, 623 (Minn. 1991) (denying
admission to applicant who had been convicted of
second-degree arson approximately five years earlier).
35. In re Matt, 829 P.2d 625, 625, 628, 630 (Mont. 1992)
(denying admission to out-of-state attorney who was
charged with conspiracy to possess cocaine ten years
earlier, and also citing lack of candor).
36. In re Roger MM, 96 A.D.2d 1133, 1133, 466 N.Y.S.2d
873, 873 (3d Dep't 1983) (denying admission to applicant
who was convicted of bank robbery and first-degree
murder).
37. In re Moore, 303 S.E.2d 810, 815, 817 (N.C. 1983)
(denying admission to applicant who was convicted of
assault and battery upon a female and second-degree
murder approximately seventeen years earlier, and also
citing lack of candor and threatening and belligerent
statements made approximately nine years earlier).
38. In re Elkins, 302 S.E.2d 215, 216, 217, 221 (N.C. 1983)
(denying admission to applicant who was convicted of
"illegal entry and secretly peeping into a room occupied
by a female person" approximately eight years earlier,
and also citing lack of candor).
39. In re T.J.S., 692 A.2d 498, 500-02 (N.H. 1997) (denying
admission to applicant who was convicted of felonious
sexual assault approximately eleven years earlier, and
also citing lack of candor).
40. In re Dickens, 832 N.E.2d 725, 726, 728 (Ohio 2005) (per
curiam) (denying admission to applicant who was
charged with "two disorderly conduct charges, two
harassment charges, a menacing charge, and a
menacing-by-stalking charge," and also citing numerous
instances of misconduct).
41. In re Bagne, 808 N.E.2d 372, 373, 375 (Ohio 2004)
(denying admission to applicant who was convicted of
aggravated assault approximately thirteen years earlier,
and also citing lack of candor).
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42. In re Hampton, 791 N.E.2d 962, 962, 963 (Ohio 2003)
(per curiam) (denying admission to applicant who was
charged six different times with operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated, with the last arrest occurring
approximately two years earlier).
43. In re Barilatz, 746 N.E.2d 188, 188-89 (Ohio 2001) (per
curiam) (denying admission to applicant who was
convicted of misdemeanor possession of a concealed
weapon in addition to having been jailed for contempt of
court and failures to pay child support approximately
seventeen years ago, and also citing lack of candor
during the screening process).
44. In re Kapel, 717 N.E.2d 704, 704, 705 (Ohio 1999) (per
curiam) (denying admission permanently to applicant
who was charged with menacing and theft-charges
that were later dropped-and with trespassing while
trying to recover his automobile from a transmission
shop, and who at another time was convicted of
disorderly conduct approximately two years earlier); see
also In re Kapel, 651 N.E.2d 955, 956 (Ohio 1995) (per
curiam) (denying same applicant).
45. In re Cureton, 717 N.E.2d 285, 285, 286 (Ohio 1999) (per
curiam) (denying admission to applicant who was
convicted of disorderly conduct approximately one year
earlier, and also citing business misconduct).
46. In re Nerren, 681 N.E.2d 906, 907 (Ohio 1997) (per
curiam) (denying admission permanently to suspended,
out-of-state attorney who was convicted of misdemeanor
falsification and custodial interference approximately
one year earlier, and also citing lack of candor and
additional misconduct).
47. In re Mitchell, 679 N.E.2d 1127, 1127-28 (Ohio 1997)
(per curiam) (denying admission to applicant who was
convicted of misuse of credit card, forgery, and
attempted transport of an unloaded weapon-in
addition to having been charged with ticket scalping,
approximately six years earlier-and also citing
additional alleged misconduct).
48. In re Keita, 656 N.E.2d 620, 622-23 (Ohio 1995) (per
curiam) (denying admission permanently to applicant
who was convicted of armed robbery, approximately
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twenty-three years ago, and also citing lack of candor
and other misconduct).
49. In re Carroll, 572 N.E.2d 657, 658 (Ohio 1991) (per
curiam) (denying admission to applicant who was
charged with possession of marijuana, receiving stolen
property, and assault approximately ten years earlier,
and also citing lack of candor).
50. Bean v. State ex rel. Okla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs (In re
Bean), 766 P.2d 955, 957, 958 (Okla. 1988) (denying
admission to applicant who was convicted of
misdemeanor possession of marijuana and controlled
drugs, simple assault, and driving while intoxicated
approximately four years earlier, and also noting that
applicant may be unfit to practice law in light of his
alcohol problems).
51. Vaughn v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs for the Okla. Bar Ass'n,
759 P.2d 1026 1028, 1031 (Okla. 1988) (denying
admission to applicant who was charged with sodomy,
lewd molestation, and second-degree rape approximately
five years earlier).
52. In re Covington, 50 P.3d 233, 233, 234, 238 (Or. 2002)
(en banc) (denying admission to applicant who was
charged with manufacture and distribution of marijuana
approximately six years earlier, and also noting concern
that applicant was unfit in light of his drug problems).
53. In re Fine, 736 P.2d 183, 186, 187-88, 191 (Or. 1987)
(per curiam) (denying admission to applicant who was
convicted of felony conspiracy and flight to avoid
prosecution, which arose out of applicant's participation
in a university bombing, approximately eleven years
earlier, and also citing lack of candor during screening
in applicant's testimony regarding the bombing).
54. In re Easton, 692 P.2d 592, 594-96 (Or. 1984) (per
curiam) (denying admission to applicant who was
convicted of felony custodial interference and held in
contempt of court approximately seven years earlier,
and also citing lack of candor and other misconduct).
55. In re Roots, 762 A.2d 1161, 1164, 1165, 1170 (R.I. 2000)
(per curiam) (denying admission to applicant who was
convicted of possession of an unregistered firearm,
resisting arrest with violence, and shoplifting
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approximately eight years earlier, and also citing lack of
candor and other misconduct).
56. In re Wright, 690 P.2d 1134, 1134-37 (Wash. 1984) (en
banc) (denying admission to applicant who was
convicted of second-degree murder and possession of
heroin approximately ten years earlier, and also citing
lack of remorse and alleged unauthorized practice of
law).
57. In re Dortch, 486 S.E.2d 311, 313 (W. Va. 1997) (denying
admission to applicant who was convicted of second-
degree murder, conspiracy, and attempted armed
robbery approximately twenty-three years earlier).
58. Frasher v. W. Va. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 408 S.E.2d 675,
676-77, 682 (W. Va. 1991) (denying admission to
applicant who was convicted of driving under the
influence on three occasions approximately three years
earlier, and also citing numerous traffic offenses and
apparent alcohol dependency).
59. In re Heckmann, 556 N.W.2d 746, 747, 748 (Wis. 1996)
(per curiam) (denying admission to applicant who was
convicted of underage drinking on three separate
occasions, disorderly conduct, and driving without a
license approximately three years earlier, and also citing
lack of candor).
60. In re Martin, 510 N.W.2d 687, 687-89 (Wis. 1994) (per
curiam) (denying admission to applicant who was
convicted of forgery and seven counts of aiding and
abetting transportation of forged checks approximately
sixteen years earlier, and also citing lack of candor on
applications).
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APPENDIX II: APPLICANTS ADMITTED FOR DEMONSTRATING
REHABILITATED CHARACTER: 1983 TO 2006148
1. Hightower v. State Bar of Cal., 666 P.2d 10, 11-12, 14
(Cal. 1983) (admitting applicant who had engaged in
three instances of unauthorized practice of law and had
been convicted of contempt arising out of one of those
instances approximately six years earlier).
2. In re Kleppin, 768 A.2d 1010, 1013, 1018 (D.C. 2001)
(per curiam) (admitting applicant who had been denied
admission in Florida, despite his conviction for
conspiracy to distribute marijuana ten years earlier, but
noting that applicant failed to disclose the conviction on
one of his law school applications).
3. In re Manville, 538 A.2d 1128, 1134-35 (D.C. 1998) (en
banc) (admitting three applicants who had been
convicted of manslaughter, attempted armed robbery of
a bank, and selling narcotics over ten years before their
applications).
4. In re Sobin, 649 A.2d 589, 589 (D.C. 1994) (admitting
applicant "despite ... [his] felony convictions for
conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance and
aiding and abetting both interstate prostitution and
interstate transportation in aid of interstate
racketeering" approximately seven years earlier).
5. In re Polin, 630 A.2d 1140, 1141-42 (D.C. 1993)
(admitting applicant who had been convicted of
conspiracy to distribute cocaine approximately nine
years earlier).
6. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re D.M.J., 586 So. 2d 1049,
1049-51 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (admitting applicant
despite concluding that applicant had engaged in a
conspiracy to import cocaine twelve years earlier,
although applicant had been acquitted in his criminal
trial).
148 In re Ansell is not included because its disposition is unclear. See In re
Ansell, 788 So. 2d 1172, 1173 & n.1 (La. 2001) (per curiam) (admitting applicant
conditionally who had entered a deferred prosecution agreement for possession of
marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia at least two years earlier). But see
In re Ansell, 801 So. 2d 1064, 1064 (La. 2001) (ordering applicant's conditional
admission revoked pending further hearings).
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7. In re VMF, 491 So. 2d 1104, 1104, 1107 (Fla. 1986) (per
curiam) (admitting applicant who had been charged
with possession and delivery of marijuana
approximately nine years earlier, but noting applicant's
lack of candor during screening).
8. In re Bryant, 922 So. 2d 471, 471-72 (La. 2006) (per
curiam) (admitting applicant who was convicted of
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
approximately eleven years earlier, and also citing
delinquent credit accounts).
9. In re Hughes, 594 A.2d 1098, 1099 (Me. 1991), aff'd, 608
A.2d 1220, 1221 (Me. 1992) (admitting resigned, out-of-
state attorney who was convicted, approximately eleven
years earlier, of two counts of false statements on real
estate closing forms in an effort to divert funds from
clients).
10. In re James G., 462 A.2d 1198, 1199, 1202 (Md. 1983)
(admitting applicant who had been convicted of
"forgery," "uttering," and assault, and who had been
charged with-but not convicted of-two separate
murders approximately thirteen years earlier).
11. In re Birmingham, 866 P.2d 1150, 1151-52 (Nev. 1994)
(admitting applicant who was convicted of conspiracy to
distribute marijuana eleven years earlier).
12. In re Strait, 577 A.2d 149, 150, 157-58 (N.J. 1990)
(admitting applicant who was charged with possession
of cocaine and narcotics paraphernalia in addition to
having been convicted of various drug and assault
offenses approximately five years earlier, and rejecting
committee's finding of lack of candor).
13. In re Newhall, 143 A.D.2d 293, 294, 532 N.Y.S.2d 179,
180 (3d Dep't 1988) (admitting applicant who was
convicted of assault in the second degree approximately
nine years earlier).
14. In re Kesselman, 100 A.D.2d 606, 606, 473 N.Y.S.2d 826,
826-27 (2d Dep't 1984) (admitting applicant who was
convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in
the third degree approximately seven years earlier).
15. In re Beers, 118 P.3d 784, 785, 791 (Or. 2005) (per
curiam) (admitting applicant who was convicted of
felony conspiracy to distribute cocaine in addition to
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having been convicted of various misdemeanors
approximately thirteen years earlier, but noting
minimally a lack of candor).
16. In re Jaffee, 874 P.2d 1299, 1300-01, 1305 (Or. 1994)
(per curiam) (admitting previously denied, out-of-state
attorney who eight years earlier was convicted of
manufacture of marijuana and who violated probation
by threatening violence and possessing firearms, noting
that in California the applicant-attorney had been
suspended but was later reinstated).
17. In re Tobiga, 791 P.2d 830, 834-35 (Or. 1990) (admitting
applicant who was charged with shoplifting
approximately five years earlier and noting, but
rejecting, lack of candor concerns).
18. In re Rowell, 754 P.2d 905, 906-07, 910 (Or. 1988) (per
curiam) (admitting applicant who was convicted of
possession of marijuana with intent to sell and
possession of cocaine in addition to other illegal drug
activity approximately seven years earlier).
19. In re Ogilvie, 623 N.W.2d 55, 56, 58 (S.D. 2001)
(admitting applicant who was convicted twice for driving
under the influence and accused of abusive behavior
toward his former girlfriend).
20. Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs v. Malloy, 793 S.W.2d
753, 758-60 (Tex. App. 1990) (admitting applicant who,
two years prior, was charged with two low-class
misdemeanors and another charge that ultimately was
dismissed because the rules of court barred the
committee below from considering such misdemeanors
and offenses, and noting, but discounting, applicant's
apparently resistant and cursory responses on his bar
application).
21. In re McMillian, 617 S.E.2d 824, 827, 830 (W. Va. 2005)
(per curiam) (admitting previously denied applicant who
was convicted of felony wiretapping approximately ten
years earlier, and also citing concerns regarding
applicant's discharge from a previous job approximately
eighteen years earlier).
22. In re Vanderperren, 661 N.W.2d 27, 33-34, 41 (Wis.
2003) (per curiam) (remanding with instructions to
admit applicant who was "'cited for three alcohol-
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related offenses, six motor vehicle offenses, and one
offense each for assault, trespass, disorderly conduct,
fraudulently obtaining a driver's license and using it to
operate a motor vehicle, and for resisting arrest'"
approximately four years earlier, and also citing lack of
candor (quoting the board's Finding of Fact 3.A)).
23. In re Rippl, 639 N.W.2d 553, 555-56, 560, 562 (Wis.
2002) (per curiam) (admitting applicant who was
convicted of misdemeanor theft and cited for disorderly
conduct approximately four years earlier, but noting
psychological instability).
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APPENDIX III: CASES REMANDING MORAL CHARACTER
DETERMINATIONS: 1983 TO 2006
1. Scott v. State Bar Examining Comm., 601 A.2d 1021,
1023, 1030 (Conn. 1992) (remanding trial court's grant
of admission to applicant who had been convicted of
possessing marijuana, among other offenses,
approximately seven years earlier).
2. In re Watts, 557 A.2d 601, 602 n.3, 603 (D.C. 1989)
(remanding for further proceedings committee's denial of
admission despite the fact that applicant had been
convicted of two different felonious thefts during law
school approximately ten years earlier).
3. In re Haukebo, 352 N.W.2d 752, 753, 756 (Minn. 1984)
(remanding for further proceedings committee's denial of
applicant who had been convicted of three counts of
driving while intoxicated approximately three years
earlier).
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